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Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the
Missing Tort Claims
MARc L. MILLER AND RONALD F. WRIGHTt
Sometimes police officers get it wrong. They got it
wrong in a Chicago neighborhood in 1997, when officers ob-
tained a search warrant for a single-family residence where
they believed that "Troy," a 30-year-old man, was selling
large amounts of cocaine base. When they arrived at the
address on the warrant they discovered that it was split
into three apartments and the woman living on the first
floor said that nobody named Troy lived in the building. She
mentioned instead that a man named Jacobs lived in
Apartment Two, and had recently returned home after a
stay in the hospital. Nevertheless, the officers proceeded to
Apartment Two and broke down the door without knocking.
The police found Jacobs, a 60-year-old man, standing
inside. An officer pointed a gun at his head and asked if he
was Troy. Jacobs said he was not, and added that nobody
named Troy lived in the apartment while showing his iden-
tification to the officers. For the next ten minutes, while one
officer kept his gun pointed at Jacobs' head, the others be-
gan to search the apartment. Encouraged by their discovery
of a small amount of cocaine in the dresser located in the
bedroom where Jacobs' grandchildren slept, they called
drug dogs and continued to search the apartment for three
hours. The officers damaged Jacobs' furniture and other
property, but found no further drugs or evidence. Ulti-
t Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty and Scholarship, Emory
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mately, the government filed no charges against Jacobs or
his grandchildren.1
What is the best legal response to police misbehavior of
this sort, something serious but preventable? There are
three standard options. First, police are regulated by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
analogous state constitutional provisions, and these consti-
tutional constraints are enforced largely by excluding the
ill-gotten evidence from any criminal trial of the person who
was improperly searched. Second, police abuse is limited by
tort claims-the traditional remedy for such claims before
exclusion became the national norm.2 Third, police behavior
is reviewed by internal affairs divisions, and sometimes in-
ternal or external police review boards, supplemented by
public scrutiny through the media and the ballot box.
Occasional modern legislative and academic proposals
give tort suits a more central role in regulating police mis-
conduct.3 Such proposals provoke swift and certain schol-
arly responses: they will never work, it is said, because
various legal doctrines and litigation realities prevent tort
suits from ever becoming a reliable technique to regulate
police misconduct The trouble with these claims and coun-
terclaims is their blissful ignorance about the numbers,
kinds, and outcomes of actual tort suits against police,
which are maddeningly hard to pin down. Do tort suits offer
a viable remedy at all, or should they be dropped from the
list of options?
This essay highlights the difficulty of determining what
role tort suits do play-and therefore what role they can
play-in regulating police abuse. The goal of this essay is to
highlight a mystery-a set of seemingly inconsistent facts
about tort suits against police officers and police depart-
ments. The mystery emerges from an effort to answer the
1. See Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2000).
2. While popular opinion assumes that exclusion was adopted as a remedy
for illegal searches and seizures in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the rem-
edy of exclusion was applied earlier within the federal system in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 393 (1914), and in some states. See MARC L. MILLER &
RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE
MATERIALS 335-50 (2d ed. 2003).
3. See AKHL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES (1997); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981
SUP. CT. REV. 49, 49-58.




following simple question: how often are tort claims filed
against police officers and police departments, and with
what results?
One logical starting point would be a search for pub-
lished judicial decisions describing and affirming civil
judgments against police officers or police departments. In
the first act of our mystery, we see that it is quite rare to
find any published decisions demonstrating that civil
claimants ever win judgments against police officers or po-
lice departments. What published decisions reveal is ex-
tremely (some would say absurdly) high doctrinal barriers
to tort suits against the police. This doctrinal picture is ech-
oed in active scholarly debates about the proper scope of
tort immunities. The picture is also confirmed by a host of
hard-boiled realists (including plaintiffs attorneys) who say
that jurors will always side with cops over criminals. In
sum, the published caselaw, scholarly debates and the view
from the field bolster a simple conclusion to the simple
question: tort suits against police officers are rare, they are
usually dismissed at an early stage, and they hardly ever
result in successful verdicts for plaintiffs.
Not so fast, Inspector Clouseau. In the second act of to-
day's mystery, we sample newspaper reports of civil settle-
ments by police departments for abuse claims against offi-
cers and departments. These news stories report significant
and sometimes immense sums being paid out to settle
abuse claims, as well as payment for many smaller claims.
And there are other clues that tort suits may be an impor-
tant component in the remedies for police abuse, even
though this reality hides between the lines of government
litigation statistics and out of sight in official public records.
The discoverable sources typically reveal only the bare fact
that lawsuits have been filed and resolved, and sometimes
the gross amount of the settlement. The sources remain si-
lent or slippery, however, when it comes to the detailed ba-
sis for the claim and the terms of the settlement.
A few scholarly articles (a minor slice of the total litera-
ture on tort suits against police) hint at regular tort claims
against police. Some attorneys even hold themselves out as
specialists in police abuse cases--Johnnie Cochran made a
national reputation with such a practice, long before O.J.
assembled his legal Dream Team. In other words, the wide-
spread belief that tort suits against police are difficult and
20041 759
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rare, and a trivial part of the "remedy" pie is wrong-it is a
myth.
In our third act, we interrogate the documents, facts
and perceptions about tort litigation. We consider why the
published cases seem so out of line with news accounts of
successful tort actions, and muse on why the perceptions of
both lawyers and scholars seem so far from the realities of
practice.
The myth of virtually non-existent tort suits fits most of
the readily observable facts. While the full explanation for
the creation of any complex myth would involve a close
study of how collective beliefs emerge and take hold, we
think this myth is best explained by the absence of ready
public information and by the decision of those who know
better not to share this knowledge. One possible reason for
the silence of the documents is the decision by the parties to
seal litigation documents, including settlement arrange-
ments. Another possibility is that some (and perhaps many)
claims are settled before a complaint is filed. But the si-
lence of the documents would not be much of a problem if
the parties could speak. Unfortunately, the parties (with
the puzzling cooperation of the judge and the media when
lawsuits are filed) often keep the details of tort claims hid-
den. There is a conspiracy to protect the myth.
Thus, the myth stands largely unchallenged, with the
most important and revealing features of litigation against
the police hidden in the dark: who pays, and who is held ac-
countable for the payments? Are payouts a significant por-
tion of the police budget, or do settlements come out of the
general revenues for the city? And even if settlements are a
significant expenditure, are there mechanisms to translate
judgments into changes in policy or personnel? So long as
tort actions against the police remain secret, the myth is
likely to stand.
The investigative trail leads to two strong policy impli-
cations. First, legislatures should make it illegal for courts
or any city agency or agent (including the city's lawyers) to
seal any settlement of a tort suit or potential claim against
police officers and police departments. Second, legislatures
should require annual reports from police departments and
cities, listing the number of civil complaints and their
status, any agreements made under the threat of litigation,
a list and totals of any funds paid out, and policy changes
made in settlement of a claim. Our Epilogue suggests how
760 [Vol. 52
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some heroes of the law can destroy the harmful collective
conspiracy of the "secret police" and the harmful myth the
conspiracy has sustained.
ACT I
THE CASE OF THE MISSING CASES
Until the middle of the twentieth century, tort suits
were the remedy of choice in the United States for official
wrongdoing such as unlawful searches and seizures.' Yet an
available remedy does not necessarily make an effective
remedy, and there were reasons in the middle of the twen-
tieth century to suspect that few plaintiffs filed civil suits
against police officers and even stronger reasons to suspect
that the suits did not succeed.
The rarity of successful tort suits gave some courts a
reason to shift towards a different remedy for police mis-
conduct, the exclusionary rule. In People v. Cahanj decided
six years before Mapp v. Ohio7 and relied upon by the
United States Supreme Court,8 California Supreme Court
Justice Roger Traynor explained that the court was "com-
pelled" to adopt an exclusionary rule
because other remedies have completely failed to secure compli-
ance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police offi-
cers .... Experience has demonstrated. . . that neither adminis-
trative, criminal nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing
lawless searches and seizures.... [R]eported cases involving civil
actions against police officers are rare, and those involving suc-
cessful criminal prosecutions against officers are nonexistent.
Even when the Supreme Court enshrined the exclu-
sionary rule as the primary remedy for police wrongdoing,
tort suits remained available as an option. Tort suits re-
mained especially important where the exclusion remedy
was irrelevant because the plaintiff was not charged with a
crime.9
5. See Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
6. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955)
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).




But while tort suits remain available in theory, many
barriers have been created, mostly by the U.S. Supreme
Court, to civil claims in general, and to claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in particular. The legal barriers to tort suits
against the police stack up to make a successful climb for
plaintiffs very difficult. Individual officers benefit from
qualified immunity, a doctrine that allows recovery only for
clear violations of settled law.' ° Recovery from the police
department itself is limited in state court by traditional
sovereign immunity doctrine, which insulates the govern-
ment from liability unless it waives the protection.! Mean-
while, in federal court, suits against local governments and
police departments cannot succeed based only on one inci-
dent of wrongdoing by individual officers: the plaintiff must
prove an unlawful policy or practice by the department."
On top of these legal difficulties, plaintiffs in police mis-
conduct cases face the practical challenge of asking a jury to
favor the factual claims of a person who was a suspect in a
criminal investigation over the competing version of events
offered by a police officer. Plaintiffs also must call police of-
ficers as key witnesses to the events in dispute and these
witnesses are not eager to provide damaging testimony
against their fellow officers, and indeed may provide false
testimony. 3 The damages for violations of privacy and
proper police procedure can be difficult for juries to value,
leading to nominal payouts in some of the rare successful
10. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); see generally Alan K.
Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1995). Claims against individual officers
were not available in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), which held that individual officials could be acting
"under color of law" within the meaning of the statute, even when their conduct
also violated state law.
11. The waivers exist, but they are quite narrow and do not typically reach
many actions of individual police officers. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 2,
at 391-92.
12. In federal court, respondeat superior liability is not available against the
employer of tortfeasor officers. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
13. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMM'N REPORT 36 (1994)
(known as the Mollen Commission Report, and famously asserting that police
perjury in New York was so common that it has become known as "testilying").
See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Miscon-
duct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004).
[Vol. 52762
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cases. Such practical challenges in the police misconduct
cases make it hard to find an attorney who is willing to take
such cases on a contingent basis.14
In light of these settled doctrines and widely acknowl-
edged practical hurdles, one might predict that tort suits
against police officers or police departments will be rare
events. We set out to learn how often civil suits are filed
against the police, and with what results; we quickly found
that the question is simply stated, but not simply answered.
Where would reports of successful judgments against
police departments be found? One obvious and familiar
source would be published decisions, either from the trial
court or on appeal. While published decisions would reflect
only a small slice of actual practice, the significant interests
at stake ought to generate plenty of reported cases.
Despite the long history of tort actions to remedy un-
constitutional and excessive police action, it is extremely
difficult to find any reported cases that confirm actual pay-
outs to plaintiffs. Indeed, there are significantly more law
review articles discussing tort actions than reported deci-
sions that affirm judgments for plaintiffs.
Granted, the reported opinions do not reflect a complete
shutout of plaintiffs. There are a handful of decisions re-
porting favorable jury verdicts for claimants, as in the 1995
decision in Urena v. City of New York. 5 In Urena, residents
of an apartment filed the suit after the police entered their
dwelling without a warrant and the jury awarded $40,000
in compensatory damages! 6 But the Urena opinion illus-
trates a feature that undermines the power of the rare
plaintiff victories appearing in the pages of judicial report-
ers: the opinions about successful claims too often deliver a
thin account of the facts. They leave us with only a sketchy
idea of what the police officers did wrong, or what the de-
partment did (or failed to do) to contribute to the problem.'
14. See Matthew V. Hess, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal Reme-
dies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 164-65, 199-200 (1993);
Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffec-
tive in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753 (1993).
15. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3837 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1995).
16. Id. at *1.
17. See Gaytan v. Kapus, 181 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (false arrest and
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Lewis v. Goodie, 798 F. Supp. 382
(W.D. La. 1992) (excessive force, beating suspect); Johnson v. Suffolk County
2004] 763
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Given this feature, these opinions are both too infrequent
and too conclusory to allow any judgments about the extent
of policing problems or the effectiveness of the tort remedy.
A different problem afflicts those exceptional opinions
that offer a richer factual basis to explain a plaintiff victory.
Too many of these opinions describe police misconduct so
extreme and blatant that it is difficult to draw any general
lessons about recurring problems with police behavior.
18
Opinions describing such shocking events sound idiosyn-
cratic and offer few lessons about preventing common po-
licing problems.
Other reported decisions that qualify as judgments for
plaintiffs reveal the meager payoff for victory that awaits
many plaintiffs. The cases mention nominal damages
awarded to plaintiffs, or show appellate courts ready to re-
duce the amount of an award obtained at trial.19 For exam-
ple, in Hygh v. Jacobs,2" after a successful trial outcome for
the plaintiffs, the trial judge granted the defendants' mo-
Police Dep't, 665 N.Y.S.2d 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (unlawful arrest); Evans v.
Walker, 187 So. 189 (Ala. 1939) (assault and battery).
18. See Brown v. Bryan County, Okla., 219 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2000) (Plain-
tiff recovered "extensive" damages for improper use of force, causing severe
knee injuries, by reserve officer who was riding along with full-time officer and
was not trained in proper technique for arrest; plaintiff was stopped after
turning around to avoid a roadblock.); Kennell v. Gates, 215 F.3d 825 (8th Cir.
2000) (woman arrested based on mistaken identification; mistake discovered by
fingerprint identification section of department, but plaintiff not released from
jail for over two days; jury awarded $10,000); Martinez v. Gonzalez, 152 F.
Supp. 2d 1050 (N.D. 111. 2001) (gymnastics instructor arrested by off-duty officer
after scolding officer's son for playing on equipment; jury awarded $28,000);
City of Birmingham v. Thompson, 404 So. 2d 589 (Ala. 1981) (prisoner beaten
by police officers for refusing to change into prison uniform, award of $25,000);
Blackwood v. Cates, 254 S.E.2d 7 (N.C. 1979) (mayor ordered police to arrest a
man who had consensual sexual intercourse with the mayor's daughter; jury
awarded $120 in actual damages and $70,000 in punitive damages).
19. See Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2000) (city not li-
able for punitive damages); Ermine v. City of Spokane, 23 P.3d 492 (Wash.
2001) (jury awarded one dollar in nominal damages, court affirmed award of
fairly substantial attorneys' fees to plaintiffs); Fisher v. Rumler, 214 N.W. 310
(Mich. 1927) (reducing damages for false imprisonment and assault and battery
from $1000 to $600); City of Miami Beach v. Bretagna, 190 So. 2d 364 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (award of $900 reduced to $750); Peter Geier, Prince
George's Cops Must Pay for Prank, THE DAiLY RECORD (Baltimore, Md.), Aug.
27, 2002, at 1B (discussing a case regarding remittitur from $647,000 to
$240,000).
20. No. 88-CV-406, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15499 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1990)
(affirming $216,000 for excessive force and granting new trial on false arrest
unless plaintiff accepts reduction from $108,000 to $1,000 in damages).
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tion for a new trial on the false arrest claim, but stated that
the verdict for the plaintiffs could stand if the plaintiff ac-
cepted a reduction of damages from $108,000 to $1,000.
Much more common than any of the caselaw varieties
described so far are the published opinions that rule for
plaintiffs who lost at the pre-trial stage, granting those
plaintiffs the opportunity to make their factual claims to a
jury, however dubious those factual claims might appear to
the court.21 The Jacobs case from Chicago, described at the
start of this essay, falls into this category. Despite the com-
pelling facts, the plaintiffs faced a serious fight in the Sev-
enth Circuit just to establish their chance to take the case
to trial. Pre-trial winners such as Jacobs virtually never
appear later in the reported cases with an actual verdict
and damage award in hand. Potential but unrealized victo-
ries for plaintiffs are especially common in federal litigation
because the parties can file interlocutory appeals on ques-
tions such as the availability of immunity for some defen-
dants.22
Most common of all are the plaintiffs who lose their
claims in the reported decisions, most of them with claims
dismissed before they ever reach trial.23 Many lose when de-
fendants file motions to dismiss or motions for summary
judgment based on claims of qualified immunity.
The story told in the published cases is largely echoed
in the scholarly literature. Academic surveys of reported
police tort cases note that the judicial opinions discussing
the plaintiffs right to a future trial are far more common
21. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988)
(allowing abused ex-wife to take to trial her claim that police failed to detain
her police officer ex-husband, who later raped and stabbed her); McKelvie v.
Cooper, 190 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1999) (remanding because the detention of 19 pa-
trons of bar for 50 minutes on floor during execution of search warrant, includ-
ing groping of crotch, "might have been unconstitutional"); Miller v. Smith, 220
F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2000); Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261 (3d Cir.
2000); Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000); Shipp v. McMa-
hon, 199 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
22. See Cal. Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.
2000) (denying defendants' interlocutory appeal on immunity issue); Moore v.
City of Harriman, 218 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2000); Feist v. Simonson, 222 F.3d 455
(8th Cir. 2000) (denies defendant interlocutory appeal on immunity issue), over-
ruled on other grounds by 258 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2001).
23. See Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708 (4th Cir. 1999); Clay-
brook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2000); Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d
795 (5th Cir. 2000).
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than cases evaluating a past verdict for the plaintiff.24 The
extensive scholarly debates over the scope of qualified and
sovereign immunity happen against a consistent belief that
those doctrinal barriers are high.
Lawyers, too, share a widespread belief that tort suits
against police departments and officers are difficult to win.
In addition to the doctrinal issues, lawyers in many juris-
dictions describe a sympathy on the part of judges and ju-
ries for police officers and a suspicion about any tort claim-
ant who was engaged in illegal behavior. Few lawyers
describe tort cases against police as a profitable practice.
If victorious tort suits against police departments and
officers are rare, as the published caselaw and popular wis-
dom suggest, then the attention of scholars and policy-
makers concerned with police abuse and remedies should
either invigorate current tort remedies, design new tort
remedies, or look to other remedies as the only realistic op-
tions. Not all of the evidence, however, suggests that tort
suits against police overwhelmingly fail. An important but
outdated empirical study and newspaper reports suggest
that there are a fair number of such suits. The next part of






News reporters tell a different story from judicial re-
porters. While judicial opinions about successful tort suits
are rare, newspapers regularly carry stories of settlements
or jury verdicts in civil suits dealing with officer miscon-
24. See Seth Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Con-
stitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 496 (1997)
(published cases "did not so much announce final dispositions as set the stage
for future settlements or trials"); Victor E. Kappeler et al., A Content Analysis of
Police Civil Liability Cases: Decisions of the Federal District Courts, 1978-1990,
21 J. CRIM. JUST. 325 (1993); Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE
L.J. 781, 793 (1979) (covering reported cases from 1970 to 1977).
25. ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (Warner Studios 1976).
[Vol. 52766
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duct. Indeed, the stories suggest that suits against the po-
lice are routine matters in many cities, and that city budg-
ets make room for a steady stream of settlement payments
to plaintiffs.26
The most thorough stories in many newspapers about
lawsuits against the police deal with spectacularly large
payments to the plaintiffs. Juries make some of these
awards,27 but more commonly (as with any civil litigation in
a world of disappearing jury trials) the awards grow out of
settlement negotiations between the parties. For instance,
attorneys for the City of Miami settled a claim in 1993 for
over $7.5 million, based on allegations that officers beat a
black man and choked him into a coma.28 The largest cases
tend to involve serious physical injuries or sexual miscon-
duct by officers. The bigger payments also occur when offi-
cers act based on racial prejudice or some personal hostility
to the plaintiff.9
Although the larger payouts occasionally attract the full
attention of news reporters, a steady stream of news ac-
26. The news stories also confirm the ongoing health of a specialized legal
practice in this field. See Kevin Flynn, How to Sue the Police and Win, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1999, at B1 (discussing "growth industry").
27. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Cops Take Beating in Suits As Juries Turn
Distrustful, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., June 27, 2001 ($7 million jury verdict
for wrongful shooting of teenage suspect); John Caher, Police Brutality Case
Gives Schenectady Another Beating, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Sept. 22, 1994,
at B1 (arbitrator awards $1.67 million to plaintiff).
28. See $7.5 Million for Brutality Victim, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 1,
1993, at Al ($7.5 million current payment and agreement to pay all future
medical bills, possibly totaling $34 million); Diana Marrero, Three Women Sue
Miami-Dade, Say They Were Strip-Searched, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale,
Fla.), Mar. 6, 2004, at 1B (likely settlement of claims relating to strip searches
at jail after arrest); Patrick McGreevy, City Settles Excess Force Lawsuit, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at B8; Judge OKs Settlement in 2000 Convention Suit,
L.A. TIMES, Cal. Metro Desk, June 17, 2004, at B3; Benjamin Weiser, New York
City Agrees to Pay in Death Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at A23 ($2.9 million
settlement in police choking case).
29. See Louie Gilot, City OKs Settlement for Police Abuse Suit, EL PASO
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at lB (sodomized suspect); Heather McDonald, Police Bru-
tality Case Ends in Settlement: Family to Receive $450,000 for Christmas Eve
Incident, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Mar. 22, 2004 (officers called to party on noise
complaint allegedly beat family members, made racial slurs, and invented
charges); A $325,000 Settlement Approved by the Finance Committee, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, May 21, 2004 (plaintiff alleges he was shackled in his cell and
beaten by officers); Steve Duin, Even Blind Old Ladies Terrify the Cops,
OREGONIAN (Portland), Apr. 25, 2004 ($145,000 settlement for pepper-spraying
and Tasing of 71-year-old blind woman who did not follow police orders).
20041 767
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counts depicts a more prosaic reality about tort suits
against the police. These stories describe only limited de-
tails about the alleged police misconduct and mention rela-
tively small verdicts or payments. ° In some states, statu-
tory damage caps keep the verdicts small.3
For those of us interested in the overall role of tort
cases in regulating police conduct, the most useful news
stories do not merely recount the facts in a single case, but
track trends across time. The overview stories confirm that
police tort suits add up to a major public expense, even
though the amount involved in any single case might be
relatively small.32 In San Francisco between 1990 and 1994,
the city settled 25 cases out of court for $1.54 million, usu-
ally in amounts of $10,000 to $20,000. As for the 31 cases
contested in court, city attorneys won all but two, and the
city paid $234,600 to the two successful plaintiffs.33
The trend stories also tell us that practice varies
around the country. The unadorned numbers show some
large total payments in cities such as Los Angeles, Miami,
Philadelphia, and New York City, and much smaller totalm 34
payments elsewhere. From 1994 to 1996, for example, New
30. See Lawrence Buser, Judge Rules Police at Fault for Injuries, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), July 3, 2004, at B1 ($35,000 award to plaintiff with
broken cheekbone cause by officer putting his foot on arrestee's shoulders, neck
or face when he was on ground being handcuffed).
31. See Lawrence Buser, Germantown Police Negligent in Fatal Chase, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.) Jan. 20, 1998, at Al (statutory cap at $130,000); Dan
Christensen, Blood Pending Police Misconduct Cases, BROWARD DAILY Bus.
REV., Nov. 5, 2001, at Al (city liability in Florida limited to $100,000 per per-
son; average recovery after trial in Miami for brutality claims was $26,000).
32. See Mark Curriden, When Good Cops Go Bad: The Justice Department
Has a New Weapon to Fight Police Brutality. The Question is, How will the Gov-
ernment Use It?, 82 A.B.A.J., May 1996, at 62; Broken-Kneecaps Policing: Police
Ethics in New York, 269 THE NATION 3 (Oct. 11, 1999); Editorial, The Cost of Po-
lice Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1995, at A22 (settlements and judgments
cost New York City $87 million over five years).
33. See Dennis Opatrny, Little Danger of Sudden Wealth in Suing the SFPD,
City Fights Claims for Misconduct Hard, Rarely Pays Much, SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER, June 11, 1995.
34. See Curriden, supra note 32; Jamison S. Prime, A Double-Barrelled As-
sault: How Technology and Judicial Interpretations Threaten Public Access to
Law Enforcement Records, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 341, 352-53 (1996) (discussing
increase in payments by Los Angeles during 1980s); Christensen, supra note 31
(Miami paid $17.8 million from 1990 to 2001 to resolve 110 federal and state
lawsuits against police); Kevin Flynn, Legal Claims Filed Against Officers De-
cline Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2000, at Al (city paid $40 million to resolve
police tort claims in 1999); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE:
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York City paid about $70 million as settlements or judg-
ments in claims alleging improper police actions. In 1993,
Detroit spent more than 8 percent of its operating budget,
or $27.5 million, on police misconduct damages. By con-
trast, San Jose, California, paid only $27,500 in settlements
and judgments involving police misconduct cases in 1993
and $71,500 in 1992.35
Trends in the police tort litigation, especially those
dealing with the smaller cases, receive attention both in
traditional news sources and in reports from advocacy
groups. 3' The trends are crucial to identifying police mis-
conduct that deserves the greatest attention during train-
ing and management. Until the public assembles the infor-
mation available from a mosaic of cases, how else can it
identify renegade officers, or patterns and practices that the
department must change? Similarly, pattern information
should help lawyers and the public assess whether the
plaintiffs have real complaints or are filing lawsuits for
their nuisance value.
The news stories reveal a far more active world of tort
litigation than we find pictured in judicial opinions. But
certain details about the litigation tend not to appear in the
news stories, details that could help us judge whether the
litigation is effectively regulating the police. Some of the de-
tails deal with the nature of the police conduct: while some
stories give a full account of the incident leading to the
plaintiffs complaint, others simply place the police conduct
within a general category such as "false arrest."
An even more important gap in the stories involves the
exact terms of the settlement. Stories commonly report a to-
tal amount but offer no details about who will pay the
amount.37 Does any of the award come out of the officer's
pocket? Do any payments flow directly out of the police de-
partment budget, giving the department a vivid reason to
re-evaluate its training and supervision of officers? A good
number of stories mention payments to be made by the city,
but only a few offer details about the relevant budget lines
or insurance policies that cover the payments to plaintiffs."
POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1998), available
at http://www.hrw.org/ reports98/police/toc.htm (survey of cities).
35. Opatrny, supra note 33.
36. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 34.
37. See Buser, supra note 30.
38. See Janine DeFao, Oakland Settles "Riders" Suits: Record $10.5 Million
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These aspects of tort litigation hold the key to the mystery
of whether the litigation is effective at all in changing police
misconduct, and readers of the newspaper cannot solve the
mystery.
B. Empirical Studies
If the stories in newspapers leave important gaps in
what we can see about the overall effect of the litigation,
perhaps court-maintained statistics (and scholarly reviews
of those statistics) can fill the gaps. For all of the substan-
tial literature on remedies for police abuse and tort reme-
dies (especially section 1983 claims) in particular, few
scholars have tried to assess just how many cases are filed,
or the outcomes of those cases. A notable exception is Pro-
fessor Theodore Eisenberg, who conducted a series of em-
pirical studies in the 1980s on civil rights claims in federal
court.
In a path-breaking 1982 article Eisenberg set out to as-
sess the "widespread perception that section 1983 cases are
overwhelming the federal courts."39 Eisenberg looked at
cases in the Central District of California (which includes
Los Angeles) in 1975 and 1976. He concluded that "the
sheer volume of section 1983 cases poses no serious threat
to the federal court system. Section 1983 cases neither place
unbearable burdens on the courts nor direct massive re-
sources to relatively minor claims."4"
From our perspective, what is striking about Eisen-
berg's findings is not the relatively small amount of civil
rights claims compared to all civil filings, but the high pro-
portion of civil rights claims made against police depart-
ments. Eisenberg found that "[o]f the 276 non-prisoner
cases, 117 alleged unlawful arrest, assault or battery by the
Payout-Police Reforms Required, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 2003, at Al; Mike
Fuchs, City Appeals Landmark Verdict, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Oct. 1,
2003, at B1 (regional insurance pool to pay $1.5 million judgment); Rene San-
chez, L.A. Eyes Tobacco Windfall to Pay Police Corruption Liabilities, WASH.
POST, Feb. 18, 2000, at A4 (Mayor proposed that the city spend most of the $300
million that the city would receive from settlement of litigation with tobacco
companies to pay for expected liabilities in police misconduct suits arising out of
Rampart scandal.).
39. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Em-
pirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 483 (1982).
40. Id. at 524.
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police, and/or unlawful search and seizure."41 Eisenberg
treated the presence of a significant number of cases
against the police as a validation of the use of federal civil
rights laws:
Looking beyond the face of the complaint to ascertain more about
the nature of section 1983 cases reinforces the conclusion that sec-
tion 1983 cases usually involve important constitutional claims.
The litigants and courts take most seriously those cases involving
deprivation of rights by the police. The 117 police misconduct cases
generated thirty-three settlements or trials and nineteen dismiss-
als by stipulation.
4 2
Eisenberg conducted a follow-up study with Stuart
Schwab providing more detailed information than the
original study and incorporating additional data collected in
the same district for 1980-81. 4' Again, Eisenberg and
Schwab found that a significant proportion of all non-
prisoner federal civil rights cases were actions against the
police:
In numbers of cases filed, actions against the police dominate.
During the three years studied, they constituted 170 out of 464
(37%) of nonprisoner constitutional tort cases. Police actions were
more than twice as numerous as actions in the next highest cate-
gory, employment, of which there were 76 cases (16%). No other
category accounted for more than 16% of those filed 
....
41. Id. at 536. Eisenberg describes the remainder of the 276 non-prisoner
cases as follows:
Another twenty-four cases alleged malicious prosecution or judicial er-
ror in earlier proceedings. Plaintiffs in twenty-one cases asserted first
amendment violations and forty-six charged employment discrimina-
tion or some other form of discrimination. Challenges to the constitu-
tionality of ordinances, statutes, or similar policies (a category that
overlaps with other categories) arose in eighteen cases. Thirty-three
cases involved due process claims and twenty-seven fell into the inevi-
table "miscellaneous" category."
Id. at 536-37.
42. Id. at 537.
43. Theodore Eisenberg & Stuart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 658 (1987).
44. Id. at 690-91. Eisenberg and Schwab found that police cases were one of
two categories that showed the most "progress" through various procedure
steps: "[Almong categories with substantial filings, police and employment
cases had the highest rates of answers, interrogatories, pretrial conferences,
depositions, and trials." Id. at 691.
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Eisenberg and Schwab expanded their study still fur-
ther by incorporating results from two additional districts
outside of California for the same time period (1980-81).' 5
Again, they found that "cases brought against the police are
the largest and most successful class of constitutional tortlitigation.""6
Despite finding that "[aictions against the police ac-
count for about thirty percent of all constitutional tort
claims,"47 Eisenberg and Schwab suggest their own skepti-
cism about constitutional tort actions against the police as a
significant remedy for police misbehavior:
Interestingly, [our study] reveals a modest number of nonprisoner
actions against the police, yet constitutional tort actions figure
prominently in the debate about alternative mechanisms for en-
forcing the fourth amendment. Crude extrapolation from (our
study] suggests that nonprisoners annually file roughly 2,000 con-
stitutional tort actions against the police in federal court. This
must be a tiny fraction of all contested fourth amendment issues.
If this extrapolation accurately depicts the low number of constitu-
tional tort actions against the police, their possible role as an al-
ternative to the exclusionary rule needs reevaluation.
4 8
Though we admire the work of Eisenberg and Schwab,
we do not agree that the importance of tort remedies turns
on the proportion of such claims to "all contested fourth
amendment issues." Exclusion is much easier to pursue,
and will for some defendants satisfy their legal needs. Many
fourth amendment claims will offer little basis for tort
45. Stuart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort
Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as De-
fendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719 (1988).
46. Id. at 734.
47. Id. at 777. Eisenberg and Schwab note that a substantial fraction of the
civil rights cases against the police are based on claims for false arrest or loss of
liberty.
48. Id. at 735. One more recent study looking at a nationwide sample of sec-
tion 1983 litigation in 1991 suggested a total number of federal claims against
police at about the same level estimated by Eisenberg and Schwab. See ROGER
A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHALLENGING THE
CONDITIONS OF PRISONS AND JAILS: A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION (Dec.
1995). Hanson and Daley concluded that cases alleging assault by an arresting
officer constituted 6 percent of all 1983 suits filed. That percentage would
amount to about 1,500 of the then roughly 25,000 section 1983 filings. Cases
alleging assault by an arresting officer take longer to process than any other
type of section 1983 claim (an average of 721 days). The study concluded that
plaintiff success on these claims is relatively rare but is difficult to pinpoint.
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claims even were immunity doctrines more welcoming. Po-
tential damages for many fourth amendment claims will
lead civil rights lawyers to take such claims only in strong
cases.
But the behavior shaping function of tort claims may
exist so long as there are a decent number of successful
cases. We read the combination of news stories about pay-
ments for claims against police and the Eisenberg studies to
suggest that civil rights claims against police may be a very
substantial part of the remedy story-exactly the opposite
of visible case law and hard-to-interpret federal data. Re-
member that Eisenberg's study looked only at federal
claims: state tort claims against police officers and depart-
ments might add considerably to the total. 9 A handful of
additional scholars have found non-trivial levels of tort
suits against police, but these observations have yet to dent
the scholarly understanding, much less popular legal cul-
ture.50
The news stories on payments by government bodies for
claims against the police and the few scholarly studies rec-
ognizing that tort claims may not be rare suggest a new
collection of mysteries: how could claims against police suc-
ceed on regular occasion and yet be almost invisible in pub-
lished decisions? How can successful tort claims co-exist
with a strongly held belief among scholars, judges and prac-
titioners that tort suits are well nigh impossible? If the im-
possibility of tort claims is a myth, why has that myth de-
veloped and survived?
The disconnect between published decisions and the ac-
tual practice of tort suits is the easier puzzle to explain.
There are many reasons why litigated and published deci-
sions may systematically reflect a very different picture
than the realities of litigation. The overwhelming propor-
49. See Wayne S. Fisher, et al., Civil Liability of New Jersey Police Officers:
An Overview, 10 CRIM. JUST. Q. 45, 56 (1989); David E. Rovella, States Are New
Venue to Sue Cops, NAT'L L.J., April 20, 1998, at Al.
50. See Mary M. Cheh, Are Law Suits an Answer to Police Brutality? in AND
JUSTICE FOR ALL: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE
233, 250 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1995) (1700 to 2600 police tort
suits filed per year in federal court); ANTONY M. PATE & LORIE FRIDELL, 2
POLICE USE OF FORCE: OFFICIAL REPORTS, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, AND LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES app. B, at tbl. B-37 (1991 survey of police departments, 2558
pending cases alleging excessive force); Kreimer, supra note 24, at 499 (survey
of Lexis Verdicts database, finding 31 plaintiff verdicts in federal court for 1994,
and 43 plaintiff verdicts in state court).
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tion of civil cases are settled (just as the overwhelming pro-
portion of criminal cases are resolved through guilty pleas
and plea bargains, not trials). Scholars have discussed the
interests of "repeat players" in both the resolution of indi-
vidual claims and the way the law develops that lead to
published decisions reflecting a constricted and defendant-
oriented view of the law (and perhaps a reason why litiga-
tion may be inherently limited as a tool of reform).51 It is
easy to see why lawyers for police departments and cities
would make strong claims "invisible" through settlement.
The etiology of the larger "police tort impossibility"
myth among lawyers is harder to explain. We do not claim
to have a simple or complete explanation but we have a
strong suspicion about what has protected and sustained
the myth. A myth may retain vitality until competing
knowledge or a competing myth destroys it. Conversely, the
lack of readily available information about suits against
police in published case documents or data from govern-
ment sources protects and even strengthens the myth.
It is interesting to know that governments pay out non-
trivial sums for police abuse, but to challenge the myth it is
essential to know more about the abuse that led to the
payments. It is useful to know that claims against police
are a significant portion of the federal civil rights caseload,
but this information is an isolated factoid without further
information about how those cases were resolved. Account-
ability requires far more information than either available
federal data or news stories provide. The next section con-
siders the mechanism that has allowed the myth of the im-
possible police tort suit to thrive.
51. Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The
Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 LAw & SoC'y REv. 869, 872, 901 (1999) ("The
paradox of losing by winning... is that the experiences of individuals who win
through settlement, trial, or other legally invisible means are not reflected in
the judicial determination of rights."). A related point emerges in the literature
of alternative dispute resolution, assessing the ways in which claimants might
lose by the more formal or full litigation of rights. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Un-
derstanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-
Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993); Martin A. Frey,





In the first act we found a surprising absence of public
records on the existence and results of civil suits (or settle-
ments in anticipation of litigation) against police depart-
ments and police officers. In the second act we found indi-
rect evidence, in the form of newspaper reports of monies
paid out by cities, counties and police departments for such
lawsuits and settlements, and a few studies of aggregate
court data, suggesting a fair number of claims against po-
lice under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The mystery addressed in this
act is how the silence of the records on claims, judgments
and settlements can be aligned with the the echo from suc-
cessful claims heard in aggregate statistics and press re-
ports.
Essentially, the answer appears to be that many civil
claims against police are resolved either before a case is
filed, or through secret settlements and judgments sealed
by courts. Police departments, cities and counties are set-
tling strong cases, and perhaps even less strong cases, but
they are requiring (and probably paying for) sealed agree-
ments.52 In some places, it has become standard litigation
strategy for cities to negotiate an agreement that binds the
parties not to discuss the judgment and asks the judge to
seal the discovery documents and the settlement agree-
ment.53 Plaintiffs, wary of facing juries sympathetic to po-
52. See Maya Blackmun, Gresham Reaches Settlement With Former Police
Captain; Multnomah County Judge Seals Agreement and City Attorneys Refuse
to Disclose Details, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Oct. 18, 1990, at C2; Ruben Cas-
taneda, Putting the Screws to Police Brutality: Prince George's Lawyer Racks Up
Wins, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at B01 (sealed settlement, worth five figures);
Kenneth Heard, Case Alleging Police Abuse on Videotape Nearing Deal, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Little Rock), Feb. 16, 2000, at BI (parties agree not to di-
vulge amount of settlement); Jack Leonard, Beating of Jail Inmate Could Bol-
ster Other Brutality Suits, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at B1; Milan Simonich,
Boxer Drops Suit Against Police in Four Suburbs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Feb. 5, 2004, at Al (sealed settlement terms, plaintiff to receive up to $50,000).
53. See Ruben Castenada, Police Abuse Suits Cost Prince George's $7.9 Mil-
lion, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al (Maryland law requiring disclosure of to-
tal settlement costs written in response to concern's about county's "long-
standing policy of secrecy" in police misconduct suits); George Flynn, County




lice, are willing to settle and claim a great victory. Plain-
tiffs' counsel often work on contingency, and this may en-
courage such outcomes as well. In cities with more hostile
relations between the police and the public, the defendants
might want to avoid facing a jury.
Courts treat civil claims against police departments like
most other private actions, leaving the form of settlements
and decisions about secrecy or release to the parties. Recall
the Sherlock Holmes story about the dog in the stables who
was on friendly terms with the horse thief, leaving Holmes
with the crucial clue-silence. Similarly, the parties in-
volved in police tort litigation make no noise about the
terms of settlement.
54
The use of secret settlements and sealed judgments
should raise problems for scholars concerned about secret
settlements in civil litigation more generally, for scholars of
tort theory, for reporters, and for political theorists con-
cerned with open government. So far, none of these groups
seems to have reacted loudly to the problem.
A. Undercover Cops: Secret Settlements in Suits Against the
Police
It is surprising that secret settlements of civil actions
against the police have not become an issue for academics,
who have created an active debate on the general topic.55 A
substantial literature on sealed settlements has emerged
over the past few years, largely in response to reports about
lawsuits to recover damages for injuries sustained when
Firestone tires burst and Ford Explorers rolled over, and
lawsuits against Catholic priests for child sexual abuse.56
54. See Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of Silver Blaze, in THE STRAND
MAGAZINE: AN ILLUSTRATED MONTHLY, July-Dec. 1892, at 645, available at
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/DoyBlaz.html.
55. Theodore Eisenberg, a leading empirical student of Section 1983, noted
that "some settled cases in this study do not reveal the terms of settlement and
some cases dismissed on plaintiffs' requests or by stipulation undoubtedly were
the subject of out-of-court settlements not reflected in the district court rec-
ords." See Eisenberg, supra note 39 at 527.
56. See, e.g., Roselyn Bonanti et al., The Message of the Ford/Firestone
Tragedy, 37 TRIAL, April 2001, at 52; Avedis H. Seferian & James T. Wakley,
Secrecy Clauses in Sexual Molestation Settlements: Should Courts Agree to Seal
Documents in Cases Involving the Catholic Church?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
801 (2003).
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Current legal reforms also draw attention to the gen-
eral topic of sealed settlements. In 2002 the federal judges
of the District of South Carolina barred secret settlements
in cases affecting "the public interest" or "public safety."
The court ordered that in such cases "No settlement agree-
ment filed with the court shall be sealed. .. ."" Chief Judge
Joseph Anderson of that court has written that sealed
judgments and settlements pose "a discernable and trou-
bling trend in civil litigation in the United States."58
Increasingly, litigants are requesting that courts "approve" a set-
tlement (often in cases where court approval is not required by
law) and, as part of the approval process, enter an order restrict-
ing public access to information about the case and its procedural
history. Litigants in such cases, not content simply to agree be-
tween themselves to remain silent about the settlement, prefer to
involve the trial judge in a "take it or leave it" consent order that
would bring the might and majesty of the court system to bear on
anyone who breaches the court-ordered confidentiality called for in
the consent order. Trial judges, often struggling under the crush of
burgeoning case loads and eager to achieve a settlement, all too
frequently acquiesce in the request for court-ordered secrecy be-
cause they are told by counsel that to deny the request means the
settlement will disintegrate and the case will go to trial.
59
Other courts and some legislatures have started to limit
the ability of courts to order or approve sealed settlements
or judgments." In particular, statutes and court rules in a
57. DIST. S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03(C), available at http://www.scd.uscourts.
gov/Rules/Mar2003/CV2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). The absolute lan-
guage of the rule is not so absolute: another local rule allows any local rule to be
suspended "for good cause shown." See Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden From
the Public By Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Se-
crecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 723 (2004) (discussing court-ordered secrecy). The
South Carolina Supreme Court has followed the illustration of the local federal
district court, and issued its own rule limiting sealed settlements. See Jean
Hoefer Toal & Bratton Riley, The New Role of Secret Settlements in the South
Carolina Justice System, 55 S.C. L. REV. 761 (2004). Notably, the South Caro-
lina court has banned sealed settlements in cases involving "a public body or
institution." See S.C. R. Civ. P. 41.1(c).
58. See Anderson, supra note 57, at 712.
59. Id. at 712-13.
60. See id.; Tyler Sande, Who Should Ban Secret Settlements? An Institu-
tional Analysis of the Incomplete Attempts of the Courts and Legislatures to
Limit Secrecy in Settlement (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
authors); ROSCOE POUND INSTITUTE, MATERIALS OF SECRECY PRACTICES IN THE
COURTS: STATE ANTI-SECRECY MEASURES 101-03 (July 29, 2000) (listing state
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few states limit the power of the court to seal discovery
documents and settlement agreements in cases involving a
public entity as a party.6'
Striking in the sealed settlements literature is how ge-
neric the arguments have been, especially given the specific
kinds of cases that have generated concerns. The generali-
zation of arguments extends both to criticism of sealed
judgments and to their defense.62 A partial list of the typical
arguments in favor of court-enforced secrecy includes:
" the protection of privacy and other confidential
information;
* a general preference for private agreements over
government regulation;
" an assertion that sealed settlements are rela-
tively rare, and that many agreements only seal
the amount of a settlement;
• a worry that that a ban on secret settlements will
decrease settlements and increase trials and
other litigation expenses;
* the prospect that banning secrecy may disadvan-
tage individual plaintiffs (or put another way "se-
crecy has market value");
" a belief that liberal discovery rules have disclosed
far more information than in the past and that
secrecy can counterbalance that discovery effect;
* a belief that allowing judicial discretion about
sealing settlements provides sufficient protection
from inappropriate confidentiality;
" an assertion that private parties can simply en-
ter confidentiality agreements without the
agreement or enforcement of the court; and
statutes and rules restricting sealed settlements), available at http://www.
roscoepound.org/new/00mats.pdf.
61. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 17.095
(2003); Comment, State Payoffs Must be Public, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL,
Aug. 15, 1996, at A18 (noting that Commonwealth Court requires all settle-
ments involving tax dollars remain open).
62. An early, highly cited, and particularly good illustration of the general-
ity and emptiness of many arguments about sealed judgments-here in defense
of such judgments-was offered by Professor Arthur Miller. Arthur R. Miller,
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 427 (1991). It is important, as well, to distinguish the separate justifica-
tions for sealing participation documents or testimony, which have different




* an observation that increased electronic access to
court files and documents has exposed to the
public information that de facto has been rela-
tively private, and requires secrecy as a correc-
tive.
Among the typical arguments against secret settle-
ments are the following:
" they undermine values of open government;
" they hide repetitive misbehavior;
" they are unethical because they allow bad actors
to buy silence;
* public courts should not be asked to validate or
enforce the arrangements of private parties; and
* private parties seek to convert their private
agreements into public agreement when they
seek approval or enforcement of settlement by a
court.
Brief reflection reveals that the problems with sealed
judgments vary across different kinds of cases. It is there-
fore striking that the vast bulk of the secrecy and sealed
settlements literature does not address the relevance of
each argument to specific types of claims. 5
63. See generally Anderson, supra note 57, at 731 (critiquing some of these
arguments, and mocking the idea that "secrecy has market value"); Anne-
Therese Bechamps, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Public
Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 119 (1990); Stephen E.
Darling, Confidential Settlements: The Defense Perspective, 55 S.C. L. REV. 785
(2004); Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confi-
dentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 303 (1999);
David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2650 (1995); Miller, supra note 62.
64. See generally Anderson, supra note 57; Richard A. Zitrin, The Case
Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST.
FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115, 123 (1999); David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Prob-
lem of Court-Sanctioned Secrecy and the Exigency of National Reform, 53 DUKE
L.J. 807 (2003); Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You Don't Know Can
Kill You!, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 237; David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret
Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other
Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217; Abner J. Mikva, The Role of Judges in Secret
Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 773 (2004); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978
Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979). A large
debate was spurred 20 years ago by a seminal article by Owen Fiss challenging
the overwhelming habits of civil settlement more generally. See Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
65. But see, e.g., Seferian & Wakley, supra note 56.
2004] 779
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Even more strikingly, scholars have not separately
identified the particular problems and interests at stake in
sealed settlements in civil cases against police departments.
Yet the public interest in barring such settlements or seal-
ing of judgments seems as strong for civil claims against
the police as for sexual abuse by priests or for any other
class of civil suit.
The public interest in police litigation is confirmed by
the public actor on one side of the lawsuit; correspondingly
few privacy interests are at stake. Saying that a ban on se-
cret settlements of claims against the police will simply
lead parties to enter into private deals out of court is no an-
swer: at least with regard to police departments a public ac-
tor is involved in every case, and a ban could apply as easily
to pre-litigation claims as to settlements approved or en-
forced by courts after litigation commences.
The strongest arguments in favor of secrecy in civil
suits against the police are that a ban might decrease set-
tlements and increase trials, or lower the settlement value
for plaintiffs. But these arguments elevate the compensa-
tory function of tort law in a group of cases where the pub-
lic's competing interest in the power of tort law to deter fu-
ture misconduct should be especially powerful.
In the case of civil suits against the police (or any un-
filed claim that is the basis of a settlement), the public
should demand more than the usual amount of information
about the litigation outcome. The public and the public's
agents (including legislators and reporters), advocates, and
experts need to know far more than just the fact that a suit
has been filed, or settled, or even the dollar amount of any
settlements. Other critical questions include who pays any
monetary settlement or judgment, what efforts (if any) the
parties made to link the settlement to future police prac-
tices, and whether patterns or bad practices emerge in-
volving individual officers or units in a department. This
type of information is critical under basic assumptions of
tort theory, considered in the next section.
B. Tort Theory and Mechanisms of Deterrence
The many reasons to be hostile to secret settlements for
civil actions against the police based on officer or depart-
ment misbehavior are bolstered by the theory about the be-
havior-shaping goals of tort suits.
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One traditional view of the tort regime is that lawsuits
are intended to encourage optimal behavior. If successful
tort claims against police departments impose fines or other
constraints when those departments or officers behave un-
reasonably, then the departments should internalize those
costs. If cases are hard to bring then exemplary or punitive
damages and attorneys fee provisions can help systems at-
tain more optimal behavior. The monetary penalties should
lead the police to reduce the improper behavior to an ap-
propriate level (or at least an efficient level, whatever that
might mean for, say, police use of deadly force, or inten-
tional violations of constitutional rules).
There is a spirited debate over whether monetary li-
ability affects government actors differently than private
actors. Professor Daryl Levinson argues that governments
respond differently to monetary incentives than individuals,
and that political costs (and therefore political rather than
economic theory) best explains government misbehavior
and the most effective avenues for reducing that behavior.66
Levinson argues that "[i]f the goal of making government
pay compensation is to achieve optimal deterrence with re-
spect to constitutionally problematic conduct, the results
are likely to be disappointing and perhaps even perverse.""
Other commentators such as Myriam Gilles favor the use of
tort remedies in general, or constitutional torts in particu-
lar, arguing that economic incentives matter even though
deterrence for government actors comes from more complex
mechanisms than in the case of private parties.8
In either case-whether departments respond to mone-
tary incentives, political incentives, or both-for tort judg-
ments to shape institutional and individual behavior the
defendants must bear the cost of the misbehavior. It does
not appear that this happens in police tort cases because
the monetary cost of judgments against police are not al-
ways fully or directly born by police departments or by indi-
vidual officers. Civil judgments come out of city or county
66. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and
the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Cm. L. REV. 345 (2000). See also
James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action As Individual Remedy, 38 HARV.-
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (2003).
67. Levinson, supra note 66, at 345.
68. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The
Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 879-80
(2001) (responding to Levinson).
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funds, or perhaps from insurance policies that the local
government purchases-i.e., from taxpayers. Municipalities
indemnify officers in many cases.69 It is city council mem-
bers, county boards, and city and county administrators
who bear the financial and political cost. While those actors
might pass the political and financial costs back to police,
they may not-indeed, they may even reward police with
larger budgets, since the political returns for higher police
funding and appearing tough on crime may be worth the
budgetary cost.
The same barriers to disclosure of the nature and out-
come of individual suits against the police also create a bar-
rier to understanding who bears the cost of such suits.
News stories often fail to point out the source of funds used
to pay for successful civil suits or corresponding remedial
effects such as sanction of individual officers, internal af-
fairs investigations, or changes in internal policy.7" Limited
available information about Who Pays is disheartening for
those who want a direct monetary burden imposed on de-
partments for violations: settlements often appear to come
out of general funds rather than from the police budget.7
69. See Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits
Do Not Deter Police misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Pro-
posed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587 (2000) (study of New York City con-
cludes that state municipalities indemnify "police officers in an overwhelming
majority of civil rights cases," regardless of "whether they acted intentionally,
recklessly, or brutally; whether or not they violated federal or state law; or
whether or not they violated the rules and regulations of the New York City
Police Department ("NYPD")."); Marin A. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed
that Municipality Will Indemnify Officer's 1983 Liability for Constitutional
Wrongdoing?, 86 IOwA L. REV. 1209 (2001) (discussing indemnification for com-
pensatory and punitive damages for section 1983 violations by police officers
and concluding that "[in short, states and municipalities commonly have poli-
cies authorizing indemnification of compensatory damages, with some even
authorizing indemnification of punitive damages.").
70. For some exceptional stories that do point out the linkage (or lack of
linkage) between the lawsuit and a change in police policy, see Christensen, su-
pra note 31 (Miami keeps no records correlating litigation with police discipli-
nary action.); Kevin Flynn, Record Payout in Settlements Against Police: Offi-
cials Cite Sharp Rise in Cases Resolved This Year, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at
B1, B5 (letter from city Comptroller to Police Commissioner says department
"should make a stronger effort to analyze the data culled from these suits to de-
termine an officer's propensity to commit acts of excessive force").
71. See David C. Anderson, Policing the Police, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 1999,
at 49 ("In New York, as in other cities, settlements and jury awards are paid out
of general city revenues, rather than out of the police department's budget.");
Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not
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Full disclosure of the nature and outcome of all civil
claims against the police and settlements in anticipation of
litigation, including Who Pays, is necessary to test compet-
ing theories of deterrence, and to determine the optimum
mix of remedies. Civil suits against police departments and
officers (and settlements in anticipation of lawsuits) can re-
veal patterns and practices that would lead to internal or
external investigations, the creation of review boards, in-
vestigative reporting, or additional lawsuits. Given the doc-
trinal importance of proving a "pattern or practice" of illegal
police conduct to win federal tort claims against police de-
partments and local governments, it is little wonder that
defendants want to prevent future plaintiffs from connect-
ing the dots between past incidents and the wrongdoing in
their own cases.
Moreover, each remedy for police misbehavior and
abuse operates in the light of other remedies. Even deci-
sions about exclusion of evidence may be informed by civil
suits or wider investigations, which may tell courts, for ex-
ample, about the "good faith" of magistrates or of officers.
Conversely, suppression may illuminate unconstitutional
behavior that may be a basis for a tort suit or internal or
external review. Patterns and practices disclosed by inter-
nal administrative review might be the basis for exclusion
or tort suits. Thus, whether the principal mechanism for
shaping police department behavior is direct monetary
costs, or political costs to departments and local govern-
ments, or the result of symbiotic pressures from multiple
remedies for police misbehavior, public disclosure of civil
suits and their outcomes makes sense.
Information about the nature of civil claims against po-
lice, the outcome, and Who Pays will also help to explain
the decisions of two actors-impassioned plaintiffs and re-
porters-who might seem immune, at least some of the
time, to marginal payment in return for secret settlements.
Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed
Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587 (2000) (municipalities indemnify police of-
ficers in an overwhelming majority of civil rights cases); Marin A. Schwartz,
Should Juries Be Informed That Municipalities Will Indemnify Officer's 1983
Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing? 86 IowA L. REV. 1209 (2001).
72. News accounts give a hint of what fuller disclosure might reveal. In
Pittsburgh, annual civil judgments and settlements exceeding $1 million be-
tween 1990 and 1996 convinced the city council to create a citizen police-review
board. See Opatrny, supra note 33.
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Some plaintiffs, driven more by outrage than by desire for
compensation, might refuse to enter secret settlements.73
We wonder if such plaintiffs receive either a sufficient addi-
tional payment to overcome their passion, or excessive
pressure from their counsel to settle and to seal?
It is also surprising that secret settlements and judg-
ments have not become a hot-button issue for reporters who
occasionally write about the dramatic circumstances of
claims against the police, and even about the size of some
individual and annual payouts by governments for such
suits. Stories sometimes note a court order to seal docu-
ments, but news organizations do not highlight and fight
this limit on public access as they do, for instance, when a
judge limits public access to trial proceedings. Where is the
public's self-defined watchdog, the press, when courts follow
party recommendations to seal a judgment?
Reporters may not notice the significance of having set-
tlements sealed, since the parties would not alert them.
Perhaps this essay will help reporters to see the importance
of this question and to flag it loudly for the public.
Finally, for thoughtful citizens (much less scholars,
lawyers, policy-makers and journalists) the absence of
readily available data about lawsuits against police de-
partments and police officers should be shocking. Citizens-
including lawyers!-should have no trouble determining
how many civil actions have been filed against a police de-
partment and officers, for what claims, and with what re-
sults. This information should be available for individual
departments (whether the department operates at the city,




So how do we kill the "police tort impossibility" myth,
and improve the reality?
73. For a discussion of the professional ethics of attorneys accepting "gag
orders" as part of a settlement agreement, see Joel S. Newman, Gagging on the
Public Interest, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 371 (1990).
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Justice Brandeis observed that "Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants."74 He phrased a corollary of the
principle this way: "electric light [is] the most efficient po-
liceman."75 We share his insight, which seems especially
applicable when police departments are the institutions
that need watching. While we believe the more global ar-
guments for limiting secret settlement generally have the
stronger side of the debate, the anti-secrecy position has
overwhelming force in the police suit context. Specific ar-
guments about privacy and efficiency all appear easy to re-
solve when the claim is that agents of the public violated
constitutional norms.
Advocates of tort remedies for police misbehavior and
abuse have hoped, for over a century, that it would not be
light, but heat (in the form of tort judgments) that would
shape the behavior of departments. Open settlements do
not fulfill that hope, but we hope they can inform it. The
problem illuminated by our three act play speaks mostly to
the many harms of hiding information with great public
value. Left for further study, in light of better information,
is the role civil claims against police play (or might play) in
shaping police behavior.
Our first remedy, therefore, seeks to illuminate the
story of tort claims by banning the practice that appears to
have kept those stories from being told: secret judgments
and settlements. If the doctrinal and practical barriers to
tort suits make them extremely rare-as the direct evi-
dence explored in the first act of our play would suggest-
then civil actions should be dropped from the menu of reme-
dies seriously considered as a response to police abuse. But
even if civil suits against police departments (or pre-filing
claims) are fairly common, and result in payments to plain-
tiffs some of the time, the invisibility of these claims and
the outcomes make them only a hint of a remedy.
Proponents of each standard remedy for police miscon-
duct should agree to bar secret settlements in civil actions
against the police. Secret settlements bury information es-
sential to evaluating the effectiveness of exclusion, internal
and external review and administrative sanctions, suits by
74. Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT





government agencies, consent decrees, and civil actions.
To assess each of these remedies and the interaction among
them, the records describing all civil claims against the po-
lice should be open to public review. Information should in-
clude the original complaint and, if the complaint does not
so state, a detailed recital of the facts that are the basis for
the claim, and a detailed record of the process through
which the complaint was resolved. This record should in-
clude dismissed claims, specification of the source of funds
for any monetary judgment, and a record of any non-
monetary actions agreed to as part of settlement or ordered
as part of judgment following trial.
The ban on secrecy might extend beyond courts to all
government offices and agents, including the city attorney's
office and police counsel (for those departments with a
separate legal staff). The goal should be to limit consensual
suppression of any resolution of claims against the police
for abuse or other misbehavior.
A ban on secret settlements might include a strong pre-
sumption against the sealing of any document or statement
filed during civil litigation against the police. A hard and
fast mandate that all documents must be public may sweep
wider than necessary to achieve the goals of informing and
improving remedies for police abuse. Use of a presumption
can prevent opponents from attacking and undermining a
generally wise policy with anecdotal (but valid) exceptions.77
Who could make this reform happen? Over the past few
years bans on secret settlements have sometimes been im-
posed by courts and sometimes by legislatures." City or po-
lice attorneys-or the plaintiffs bar as a whole-could in ef-
fect implement their own ban by refusing to enter into
secret settlements.
Our own recommendation is that legislative bodies, ei-
ther on the local or state level, take the lead in promulgat-
ing such bans. The arguments for and against disclosure of
specific kinds of claims will require development of infor-
mation and policy judgments that may be most suitable for
76. See, e.g., Laurie Levinson, Police Corruption and the New Models for Re-
form, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001).
77. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 39 (noting that some of the doctrinal and prac-
tical problems with constitutional torts under section 1983 come from the vast
possible range of issues and interpretations the short and cryptic text ad-
dresses).
78. See supra notes 60, 61.
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legislatures or city councils (and to the kind of reports and
investigation that committees do best). Moreover, legisla-
tures or city councils can specify with far greater detail the
kind of information that should be collected and reported by
courts (and their clerks) and by institutions such as police
departments and city attorneys.
As is true for most areas of civil practice, the over-
whelming proportion of police misconduct claims are likely
to be resolved without trial. Legislative bodies can require
that specific information be included in any settlement or
judgment stemming from civil suits against the police, or
from settlements made in anticipation of litigation. Such
settlements should include the kind of substantive, process
and outcome facts discussed above.
Legislative bodies should be interested as well in the
consequences of individual civil suits beyond the immediate
resolution of the plaintiffs claim. Thus, they should require
a report from the police department specifying all addi-
tional responses in terms of internal review, administrative
sanctions, or changes in policy stemming from each civil
suit. (In the absence of legislative direction, police depart-
ments can and should produce such reports on their own,
and can gain credibility and political credit for doing so.)
Banning secret settlements in civil actions against the
police and requiring the collection of case-specific informa-
tion would be a good start, but is not alone sufficient to in-
form the important policy and scholarly debates over reme-
dies for police abuse. Legislative bodies should also care
greatly about the patterns revealed by civil suits and their
outcomes.
Legislatures, city councils, or county commissions
should require an annual report from the police department
specifying the total number of civil complaints filed against
the department and against individual officers, the status
of those complaints, and the outcome of all civil cases re-
solved or settled in the prior year.79 Such reports might in-
79. Cf Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1167-94
(2000) (listing "mandatory recordkeeping" along with crime mapping and other
examples of techniques to promote more transparent policing); Rob Yale,
Searching for the Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1841
(1997) (proposing a national registry of complaints against police officers). A
selective examination of web sites for seven major city departments (Los Ange-
les, San Francisco, New York, Chicago, Miami, Dallas, and Houston) and for
four smaller departments in Florida (North Miami, North Miami Beach, Miami
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elude a description of any policy changes in the department,
the outcome of internal investigations, and, in conjunction
with the local district attorneys, the number of cases gener-
ated by the police agency where evidence was excluded (as
well as an indication of how many cases were ultimately
dismissed entirely as a result of the excluded evidence)."°
The best reports will include information on the patterns of
claims and responses over time.
The prominence of federal claims under section 1983-
based on concerns that local district attorneys may not ag-
gressively prosecute police abuse81 and that local courts and
juries may be overly protective of the local police-might
suggest that a national database or federal reports are in
order. The experience with the data collected by the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States courts on federal
civil rights claims is not encouraging. Despite serious faults
of over-aggregation with this data described by Eisenberg
and Schwab more than 15 years ago,"2 the Administrative
Office has continued to report only the grossest of catego-
ries. 3 Civil rights claims are not hard to divide into some-
what finer categories. Lawsuits against police departments
are easy to identify. At an absolute minimum, the Adminis-
trative Office should separate the information about these
claims, and if the AO will not itself make this inexpensive
Beach, and Fort Lauderdale) revealed that most included no information on po-
lice misconduct or at most a contact number for the internal affairs division.
Only two (Los Angeles and Chicago) included additional information on police
misconduct-in both cases as a result of a federal consent decree. Most the po-
lice department web sites do highlight "top cops."
80. See David Kocieniewski, In Brutality Case, Penalty Was Lost Vacation,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at C24 (departmental tribunal penalized detectives
in excessive force case by loss of 20 vacation days, despite prosecutor recom-
mendation of dismissal from department).
81. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing With Police
Abuse, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & LAw 305, 305 (2001) ("For obvious reasons, prose-
cutors are reluctant to alienate the very officers that they must work with and
rely on in their cases"); Ralph Blumenthal, Rarely Used Courts Investigate El
Paso Police and District Attorney, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2004 (State Court of In-
quiry convened to determine if district attorney and police department con-
spired to shield officers accused of brutalizing people in six cases).
82. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 43 at 660-668 (discussing, critiquing
and criticizing the Administrative Office statistics on civil rights cases, but not
suggesting improvements).
83. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL




correction in the reporting of information already on hand,
then Congress should order it to do so.
There is nothing wrong with a national agency such as
the FBI or one of the Department of Justice research agen-
cies collecting better information, especially if the federal
reports include data on state claims. But a focus on national
data misses essential points about the administration of
police agencies. Police administration is a local responsibil-
ity, and the issues of concern will vary by locality and by
the size of the department.
Whatever national data is collected, it should reflect lo-
cal experience. Standardized reports issued under a federal
mandate may not produce the information that will most
help the actual institutions involved with police behavior in
each jurisdiction most effectively play their role. For exam-
ple, reports produced after crises in police departments
sometimes specify that a small group of officers (sometimes
named) or particular units are the source of a large number
of complaints. This was the case for the Christopher Com-
mission report following the assault on Rodney King in Los
Angeles, where the report identified a short list of problem
officers, including one officer who would later contribute to
the O.J. Simpson debacle." National reports aggregating
abstract data will miss exactly this kind of jurisdiction spe-
cific information and obscure appropriate responses.
Regularized annual reports on civil claims of police
abuse might be combined with a description of any prosecu-
tion of police officers and of the activities of police review
bodies (such as a citizen review board) and the complaints
they receive. Together these sources of information should
paint a fairly clear picture of police-citizen relations in each
city and county. These reports may be damning in some
places-it is hard to imagine they would not be eternally
84. See William Christopher et al., Report of the Independent Commission on
the Los Angeles Police Department ("Christopher Commission Report") (1991),
in Louis A. RADELET & DAVID L. CARTER, THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY 548,
549-50 (5th ed., 1994) ("Of approximately 1,800 officers against whom an alle-
gation of excessive force or improper tactics was made from 1986 to 1990, more
than 1,400 had only one or two allegations. But 183 officers had four or more
allegations, 44 had six or more, 16 had eight or more, and one had 16 such alle-
gations." One of the 44 "problem officers" was Detective Mark Furhman.); Jim
Woods, Jodi Nirode & Mark Ferenchik, Issue of Abuse Remains, Say Black
Leaders, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 2002, at Al (After settling lawsuit over




damning in a place like Los Angeles-but the reports may
also provide comfort and support to many departments. As
with video-taped interrogations, significantly greater in-
formation about police-citizen (and police-suspect) interac-
tions has as much capacity to mollify as to incite the public.
This fact-that the truth can be both a sword and a
shield-should lead thoughtful departments, officers and
police unions to call for (rather than to oppose) our sug-
gested reforms.
Some of the surprising heroes in our story are local re-
porters writing stories about civil claims and their out-
comes. Without news reports of payouts by cities and coun-
ties for civil claims against the police, the mystery
examined in this article would remain largely hidden. Re-
porters have on occasion noted when judgments or settle-
ments were sealed, making the confidentiality a part of the
story. We encourage reporters following police beats and
their editors-for both the stories that claim national head-
lines and those appearing on page 5 of the metro section in
the local paper-to describe the basis for the claims, report
on the process of their resolution, highlight any secrecy in
the final resolution, and ask questions of the police and su-
pervisory agencies about any changes in policy or practice
that result either from individual suits or over time. Re-
porters should also pay special attention to the source of
any funds that are paid to plaintiffs. News stories are
themselves part of the dynamic of oversight and debate,
and, to their credit, reporters and editors around the coun-
try seem to have recognized this role.
Our mystery ends, therefore, without a satisfying re-
view of the clues, an impressive body count, or an arrest of
the butler (though we do highlight the need for a better
candlestick!). We cannot declare civil actions against police
to be either common or non-existent, either the key to
regulating police or largely irrelevant. Our primary recom-
mendation is for legislative bodies, not courts, to discourage
secret settlements. To add some zing to our proposals, we
also suggest more disclosure, more information, more data,
and more reports. We offer sincere praise of journalists, of-
fering only gentle encouragement for more journalists to
follow the leaders. We try to alert other scholars to issues
that they have either rarely addressed (the number, content
and visibility of civil claims against the police) or hidden
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beneath the cloak of over-generalization (secret settle-
ments).
But while our short mystery and its implications may
lack a punchy theatrical ending, the incidents that lead to
our recommendations are filled with drama. It is hard to
think of many points of intersection between government
agents and citizens as fraught with tension or drama. That
makes the regulation of police and the information that ex-
poses the fault lines in relations between citizens and police
questions worth keeping in the public limelight.

